Last Wednesday, the Supreme Court issued a broad interpretation
of a federal law that makes it a crime for people convicted of domestic
violence to possess guns.
The court refused to consider a challenge to the law based
on the Second Amendment, saying that argument had received only a “cursory nod”
in the briefs. Instead, the court considered the meaning of the term domestic
violence, with the majority concluding that it encompassed acts “that one might
not characterize as ‘violent’ in a non-domestic context.”
Interpreting Congress’ law on firearm prohibition for criminals, 18 U.S.C. § 922. This law did not previously apply to people convicted of certain types of domestic violence because of the phrase “use… of physical force” as found in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C). Section (g)(8)(C) criminalizes gun possession for individuals subject to a court order that “prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.” Until the Supreme Court’s decision inUnited States v. Castleman, the phrase “physical force” in section (g)(8)(C) was interpreted to mean only “violent force” enacted upon one’s spouse and not any other type of force that might be considered “less violent,” such as hair pulling, pushing, grabbing, etc.
However, the Court’s holding now interprets “physical force” to mean any type of domestic violence, even cases of domestic violence that might not seem “violent” at first glance (fromSCOTUSblog). Much of the precedent for the decision in United States v. Castleman comes from the 2010 case Johnson v. United States, in which a conviction of battery was also classified as a “violent felony.” This new interpretation of “physical force” means that section (g)(8)(C) of Congress’ law on firearm prohibition for criminals applies to all people convicted of domestic violence, and it is now a crime for such individuals to possess firearms.
The case concerned James A. Castleman, a Tennessee man who
in 2001 was convicted of assault in state court for causing bodily injury to
the mother of his child. Court records do not say precisely what he did or what
injuries the woman sustained.
When Mr. Castleman was indicted under the federal gun law,
he argued that it did not apply to him because his state conviction did not
qualify as a crime of domestic violence. Though the federal law defines a
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” as one involving the use of physical
force, he argued that the state law under which he was charged did not require
proof of such force.
A federal trial judge agreed, saying one could theoretically
violate the state law by tricking a victim into drinking a poisoned beverage.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Cincinnati,
affirmed the trial court’s decision.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed that decision, though
the justices disagreed on the rationale.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, writing for six justices, said that
domestic violence must be understood broadly to include “seemingly minor acts.”
The word violence standing alone connotes substantial force, she said, but that
is not true of domestic violence.
She gave examples of what might qualify as only domestic
violence: pushing, grabbing, shoving, hair pulling and “a squeeze of the arm
that causes a bruise.”
Since Mr. Castleman had pleaded guilty to having “caused
bodily injury,” Justice Sotomayor wrote, the use of physical force serious
enough to amount to domestic violence could be assumed.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices Anthony M.
Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer and Elena Kagan joined the
majority opinion.
In a concurrence, Justice Antonin Scalia agreed that the
federal law applied to Mr. Castleman. But he objected to the notion that
domestic violence encompassed more acts than violence did, calling that an
absurdity “at war with the English language.”
Justice Scalia criticized Justice Sotomayor for relying on
“law-review articles, foreign government bureaus and similar sources” for her
broader definition. Such sources, he said, “are entitled to define ‘domestic
violence’ any way they want.”
“But when they (and the court) impose their all-embracing
definition on the rest of us, they not only distort the law, they impoverish
the language,” Justice Scalia wrote. “When everything is domestic violence,
nothing is. Congress will have to come up with a new word (I cannot imagine
what it would be) to denote actual domestic violence.”
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., joined by Justice Clarence
Thomas, issued a separate concurrence in the case, United States v. Castleman,
No. 12-1371.
